Forum Pakistan

These occupy an extremely important place in the system of Pakistan's foreign relations, in the political, economic, social, religious, and other areas. They are of vast significance for Pakistan's external security and also make a great impact on its domestic politics.The division of *British India entailed numerous disputes between Pakistan and India on territorial, financial, and property issues, which created an atmosphere of tension, anxiety, and mutual mistrust, which in tum slowed down the resolution of the conflicts. In the late 1940s, bilateral disputes arose related to the division of the currency and gold reserves, the property of state institutions and private individuals, the refugees, and the stocks of military equipment. Only some were settled; most simply ceased to be as acute as before. Nevertheless, the tension in relations continued to increase over the long, drawn-out dispute over Jammu and *Kashmir. This dispute, which has not been resolved to this day, resulted in the armed conflicts of 1947-48 and 1965 between Pakistan and India (see *Kashmir Dispute). The conflict in September of 1965 remained confined to the south-western sector of the border between India and Pakistan. While the 1965 war was settled by an agreement reached in Tashkent in January 1966, some of its articles were never fulfilled, hostile propaganda never ceased, mutual accusations and suspicions were voiced both by official representatives and the mass media.

During the constitutional crisis of 1971 the confederal six points of the Awarni League, the elected party, came into conflict with the military regime's Legal Framework Order, guaranteeing the territorial integrity of Pakistan (See Bangladesh-Pakistan Relations). Awami League volunteers began an armed struggle by attacking the non-Bengali settlers. India and the Soviet Union took the joint position that any reprisal against Mukti Bahinis (the militant wing of the Awarni League) would be treated as an act of war. The Indo-Soviet Friendship Treaty which was signed when China and the US were unable to stabilize their relations, worked to the advantage of India. On 25 March 1971 the military reprisal by the Pakistan Army precipitated the crisis. On 26 March 1971, Awami League leaders who had escaped to India proclaimed an independent Bangladesh and on 17 April formed a government in exile on Indian soil. Pakistan's Deputy High Commissioner was arrested by Indian authorities. This triggered a flood of refugees to India which resulted in a sharp deterioration of relations between the two countries. In the summer of 1971, Pakistani and Indian troops on the eastern border met in dangerous confrontation. Early in the winter, the crisis entered a phase of armed conflict both in the east and west, and along the ceasefire line in Jammu and Kashmir. On 16 December 1971, the East Pakistani army capitulated. Hostilities on the western front ceased on 17 December 1971. As a result, Pakistan occupied about 50 square miles in the Chamb sector which controlled the communications of the state of Jammu and Kashmir with the rest of Indian territory. These communication facilities were the main target of strikes by the Pakistani army, just as they were during the 1965 armed conflict. Pakistan also seized control over Indian territory in the state of *Punjab. Indian troops seized about 50 Pakistani posts north and west of the ceasefire line in Kashmir and some territories of Pakistan in the Punjab and Sindh.

Realizing the need to solve disputes by political means, Z.A. *Bhutto proposed, in January 1972, to begin negotiations with the Government of India. In late June-early July 1972, a meeting took place in Simla between President Z.A. Bhutto of Pakistan and Prime Minister Indira Gandhi of India. At the end of the talks, an agreement was signed in which the two sides assumed the obligation to achieve normal relations and to consolidate peace and security in South Asia (see Simla Agreement. The restoration of diplomatic relations between India and Pakistan in July 1976, and the resumption of air travel between them signified the conclusion of an unfortunate stage in their relations and the overcoming of the negative consequences of the 1971 armed conflict.

At the end of the 1970s and especially in the early 1980s, the development of these relations slowed down. Serious differences and contradictions emerged, not only on a number of issues of bilateral relations but also on regional issues relating to the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The growing scale of US-Pakistan cooperation in military and political spheres evoked a negative reaction from India.

In the 1980s and early 1990s there was a growing danger from the Kashmir problem to the stability of the relations between India and Pakistan. The Kashmir dispute was complicated by new conflicting territorial claims on the Siachen glacier (length 85 kID., width 5 to 10 kID.) in the *Karakoram Mountains. Since the spring of 1984, the Siachen glacier repeatedly became the scene of armed conflict between the two armies' special units. In the second half of the 1980s, several rounds of Indo-Pakistan negotiations were held on the Siachen question; these talks revealed the fundamental difference of the political position between the two countries. In the same period, their differences over the nuclear problem deepened.
Subsequently the two states made efforts to settle their disputes and to normalize their relations. Rejecting the January 1980 proposal made by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to conclude a non-aggression pact which would contain the two countries' obligation to reject aggression and use of force in their mutual relations, the Government of Pakistan proposed, in the autumn of 1981, to begin bilateral agreements aimed at concluding a treaty on mutual guarantees of non-aggression and non-use of force. Early in 1982, the Indian government proposed to Islamabad a treaty of peace, friendship, and cooperation. It was assumed that the treaty would state the obligation not to permit foreign bases on their territory, settling all issues between the two nations without reference to any third party. From 1982 to 1989, Delhi and Islamabad continued to meet on this issue, but failed in the end to conclude any agreement. The unstable relations between India and Pakistan were repeatedly discussed during high-level meetings of representatives of the two countries; these became regular, especially in connection with the annual conferences of the heads of states and governments of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). One important diplomatic event in the relations was the arrival of Rajiv Gandhi in Islamabad in December 1988 for the Fourth SAARC summit conference. His talks with Benazir *Bhutto resulted in the signing of several agreements, including the obligation not to attack each other's nuclear sites. The top-level contacts between them continued during Rajiv Gandhi's brief visit to Islamabad in July 1989. Intense negotiations on various levels at the end of the 1980s and in the early 1990s resulted in agreements on such issues as joint actions to combat drug smuggling, measures to strengthen the Pakistan-Indian border (to stop illegal crossings), easier contacts between the citizens of the two countries, and easier access for tourists. Having proposed, as early as the mid 1970s, the idea of transforming South Asia into a nuclear-free zone, Pakistan continued to search for ways to its implementation. In June 1991, Prime Minister Nawaz *Sharif of Pakistan called for mediation of the United States, the Soviet Union, and China on the issue of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons in South Asia. Pakistan also proposed to conclude bilateral agreements or a common agreement by the South Asian nations to ban all weapons of mass destruction. Pakistan also proposed measures for mutual balanced reduction of conventional armed forces in South Asia in accordance with the principle of equal and guaranteed security.

Relations between the two countries worsened when the BJP, a fundamentalist Hindu party, formed the government in India in 1998. The threatening posture of the Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee was followed by nuclear tests on 11 and 12 May 1998. After waiting to judge the intensity of world reaction to the Indian tests, Pakistan conducted its own nuclear tests on 28 and 30 May 1998. This stand-off gave rise to a temporary thaw during which Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited Lahore on a goodwill visit inaugurating a bus service between Lahore and Delhi. However, from March 1999 a major crisis erupted when Kashmiri volunteers aided by Pakistani irregulars captured the Kargil heights on the Line of Control. Following intense international pressure, Pakistan withdrew from Kargil. The military takeover of 12 October 1999 worsened relations. The attack by militants on the Indian Parliament (13 December 2001) brought the two countries to the brink of war. The SAARC summit in Kathmandu on 6 January 2002, saw the Paki tan President making a personal initiative but it has not resulted in the relaxation of tension. The Almaty Conference of 4 June 2002 had also failed. As against the Pakistan proposal for neutral monitoring of the LoC, Vajpayee offered joint Indo-Pakistan monitoring which was unacceptable to Pakistan as it would penetrate the security system of the country and would render it open to Indian propaganda. One 23 August 2002, Pakistan repulsed an Indian attack on the Gultari sector. On 8 February 2003 India expelled the acting Pakistan High Commissioner. There was a change for the better on 18 April 2003 when Atal Bihari Vajpayee offered to hold talks with Pakistan Prime Minister Mir Zafrullah Khan Jamali. On 29 October 2003, India proposed 12 Confidence Building Measures (CBMs) mostly dealing with the resumption of air, train, road and sea routes including the revival of the Khokhrapar-
Munabao rail links which had since the 1965 war, opening of a bus route between Lahore and ..Arnritsar, and a Srinagar-Muzaffarabad bus service linking both sides of Kashmir. In view of the disputed nature of the territory, Pakistan initially wanted UN monitoring on this route, but does not insist on it anymore it. The same evening Pakistan responded with 13 CBMs mostly in acceptance of Indian CBMs.

The thirteenth measure was the offer of a 100 scholarships in Pakistan technical institutes to Kashrniris from Indian held areas. On 24 September 2003, Prime Minister Jamali announced unilateral cease-fire on LoC and Siachen. On 30 November, Pakistan allowed over-flight rights to India. On 17 December, President Musharraf expressed his willingness to set aside UNSC resolution on Kashmir, a development welcomed by India. Pervez Musharraf said that accepting LoC as an International border was not acceptable. Following a meeting on the sidelines of the SAARC summit in Islamabad, Pervez Musharraf and Atal Bihari Vajpayee issued a joint statement on 6 January 2004. Both sides hoped to consolidate the CBMs earlier proposed. President Musharraf undertook not to allow any territory under Pakistan control to be used for terrorism in any form. Both leaders looked forward to 'composite' dialogues between the two countries, which would include the resolution of the Ka hmir dispute. Foreign Ministers talks are scheduled for 13 and 14 September 2004.